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Optimal Information Design
in Two-Sided Trade
By Pradhi Aggarwal1
1
Program in Applied Mathematics, Yale University

ABSTRACT

In a two-sided market with a broker, the broker can influence the buyer’s and seller’s optimal trading behaviour
through strategic information design. We study the impact of information about waiting times on riders and drivers
in a rideshare market. We consider three information regimes: the first in which no information about time is
revealed, the second in which true waiting times are communicated, and finally an intermediate regime in which
agents are only told whether their waiting time falls within a high or low category. We evaluate the optimality of each
information regime by maximizing welfare and revenue for each setting and and that by concealing information, the
broker can incentivize agents to accept less favorable trades. On the other hand, more information restricts trade to
sufficiently favourable bargains, yielding higher expected welfare and expected revenue.

1. INTRODUCTION
We study optimal information design in a two-sided trading problem where buyers and sellers trade over a single homogeneous
product and a broker mediates the trade. We consider individually
rational, incentive-compatible mechanisms and optimize for either
welfare or the broker’s revenue.
Our study is motivated by and set in the context of rideshare markets. Rideshare platforms present a two-sided marketplace where
agents have multi-dimensional preferences. For example, a rider
seeking a ride on Uber typically values a ride based on its price, wait
time, car type, driver rating, and so on. Similarly, a driver offering a
ride on Uber typically values it based on the wage he receives, the
opportunity cost of providing the ride, time or distance, passenger
rating, and so on. The two most important factors for both agent
types here are price and time. Buchholz et al. (2020) conduct an
empirical analysis of the Czech-based taxi and ride-hailing application Liftago in order to directly measure a customer’s value of
time, or their willingness-to-pay for time savings, and study the
impact of heterogeneity in value of time on a market where waiting
time is used to ration the good. More recently, Goldszmidt et al.
(2020) present an experimental analysis and estimate a consumer’s
value of time in the United States using field experiments with the
ridesharing company Lyft. Given the significant impact that time
has in the rideshare context, we wish to study how a platform can
use information about waiting times strategically. Both riders and
drivers face a fundamental yet implicit trade-off between time and
price. Although waiting times are non-negotiable and agents trade
predominantly on price, can information about waiting times influence agent incentives and market outcomes?

sider the problem of matching riders with strategic drivers under
varying levels of platform control. Besbes et al. (2018) propose
location-specific pricing to control the spatial distribution of supply
while Rheingans-Yoo et al. (2019) analyze revenue optimal pricing
and driver compensation with drivers having heterogeneous preferences over location.
Our work differs from these papers in two aspects. First, instead
of considering demand and supply as a whole, we fix a rider and
driver and view the problem as a stationary game with two agents
and a broker. This allows us to model a static Bayesian game of
incomplete information, where the prior distributions of rider and
driver valuations are public knowledge but they are unaware of
each other’s realized valuations. Most importantly, we build on
Myerson and Satterthwaite’s seminal 1981 paper, which presents
Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational trade allocation mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade
or a broker’s revenue.

Secondly, while the above papers study optimal matching and pricing mechanisms, we add information design as an additional lever
the platform can use to strategically influence trade. Bergemann
and Morris (2019) describe the information design problem as a
study of how the mechanism designer can influence the individually optimal behavior of agents only through the choice of the
information provided. Even if the broker cannot control outcomes
or force agents to choose certain actions, she can influence them
simply by choosing whether to and how to reveal information that
agents depend upon when choosing an action. Bergemann and
Morris (2019) present a broad overview of the literature on this
topic and illustrate key insights, the foremost of which is that the
mechanism designer may often find it optimal to selectively obThe rideshare industry has recently prompted an extensive body fuscate information. We vary information levels along two dimenof literature on optimal platform design with strategic agents. sions: i) the platform revealing information about waiting times to
Ghili and Kumar (2020) study pricing mechanisms to respond to riders and drivers, and ii) riders and drivers revealing their private
skewed spatial distributions of supply. Afeche et al. (2018) con- valuations to the platform.
Published by EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale, 2021
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The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we
describe our model. In section 3, we allow agent valuations to remain inaccessible to the broker and compute posted price mechanisms that maximize welfare and revenue for zero or complete
information about waiting times. In section 4, we use a direct bargaining mechanism to elicit valuations from riders and drivers and
again compute welfare-maximizing and revenue-maximizing trading mechanisms. In section 5, we ask if an intermediate revelation
about waiting times can achieve a better result and determine the
corresponding optimal mechanism. In section 6, we allow for heterogeneous rider preferences over waiting times and study its impact on the market. Finally, in section 7, we present a discussion of
our results and conclusion.

3. POSTED PRICES INDEPENDENT OF w, z
The values w and z are private information of riders and drivers,
respectively. We begin with a baseline model in which the broker
does not have access to these realized values and only relies on the
prior distributions. We consider two levels of information about x.
Proposition 1. Providing information about waiting times results in higher volumes of trade and expected welfare.
We show this in the remainder of this section.

3.1. No Information About Waiting Times

First, we assume that agents are given no information about realized waiting times. Instead, they operate on the basis of the expected value
. We impose ex-interim individual rationality conOur model contains two agents: riders, denoted by r, and drivers, straints. That is, agents must have nonnegative expected utility
denoted by d. The rideshare platform acts as a broker. Core param- from trade knowing their own willingness to pay or opportunity
eters of the model include:
cost but before any trading outcomes are determined.

2. THE MODEL

• w: the rider’s willingness to pay ~ U(0, 1)
• z: the driver’s opportunity cost ~ U(0, 1)
• x: waiting time, or transportation cost ~ U(0, X)
We assume that all prior distributions are public knowledge. The
rider’s valuation is defined as her willingness to pay minus the
squared transportation cost.

Thus, agents are willing to trade at the following set of prices
(3)

(1) In order to have nonnegative expected trade, we must have
.
Without any information about the realized values of w and z, the
Similarly, the driver’s valuation is the sum of her opportunity cost broker can set a welfare-maximizing fixed posted price that is indeand squared transportation cost.
pendent of w, z and agents will accept the ride whenever (3) is satisfied. Expected welfare is defined as the sum of the two agents’
(2) utilities multiplied by the allocation mechanism.
In this context of this paper, we assume that the rider’s willingness
to pay and the driver’s opportunity cost is independent of transportation cost. While this may be an unrealistic assumption, doing so
allows us to separate heterogeneity in rider and driver preferences
from the effect of transportation cost on rider values and driver opportunity costs. Then, we can evaluate valuations pointwise and
don’t solve for the joint distributions. Both agent’s utilities are de- This is maximized at
fined as the difference between their valuation and the price of the nism is
ride, conditional on trade taking place.

If no trade takes place, utility is 0. We compute trading mechanisms
that define an allocation rule and a price. The two outputs of any
mechanism are as follows:

. Thus, the welfare-maximizing mecha-

and gives us

• p(w, z, x): price of the ride
• q(w, z, x): the probability of trade (1 for rides offered and 0
for rides not offered)
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/yurj/vol2/iss1/8
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alized waiting time x to agents and repeat the same computations Without knowledge of the agents’ realized valuations, the broker
as above. Agents are willing to trade at the following set of prices: charges a price independent of waiting time. The first mechanism
underestimates volume of trade and thereby welfare for realized
(4) waiting costs lower than the expected value. Conversely, it overestimates welfare for high waiting times. Revealing waiting times in
which imposes the restriction
. With (4) as the allocation the second mechanism results in higher volumes of trade and highmechanism and the broker setting a posted price,
.
er expected welfare, but restricts unfavourable trade where
This effect becomes more pronounced as X increases and a larger
proportion of realized x2 values fall below the expectation.

which is again maximized at
. Waiting time has a symmetric
effect on riders and drivers in this model as w and z are identically
distributed. Thus, information about x doesn’t influence prices in
the absence of knowledge about the realized values w and z. The
welfare-maximizing mechanism is given by

4. BILATERAL TRADE

In this section, we augment the model with information about the
realized values of w and z. Since these aren’t publicly observable,
the broker must elicit them from the rider and driver. Our model
uses the direct bargaining set-up described by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), in which each agent simultaneously reports his valuation to the broker and the broker then determines whether trade
takes place and the price of the object. Each agent’s only action is to
report w and z, respectively. In addition to individual rationality, we
now impose incentive compatibility constraints. Incentive compatWe compute the expected welfare and expected volume of trade in ibility is satisfied if honest reporting forms a Bayesian Nash equithis market for all realizations of x, keeping in mind that trade only librium. That is, each agent can maximize her expected utility by
occurs for
.
reporting her true value, given that the other agent is expected to be
honest. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) compute optimal trading
mechanisms that are both individually rational and incentive-compatible. For a proof of their theorems, we encourage the reader to
consult their paper. Here we simply follow their methodology as
given, with the addition of waiting times in both agents’ valuations.
Theorem 1 of their paper characterizes necessary and sufficient
conditions for incentive compatibility with individually rational
agents:
(5)
Figure 1 displays expected welfare and Figure 2 displays expected where vr, vd is each agent’s valuation as defined in (1)(2), Vr or Vd is
volume of trade under the two mechanisms described in this sec- the respective maximum value, and F(×) is the cumulative distribution.
tion function. The same equation holds true with the inclusion of x

Figure 1. Expected welfare with posted prices.

Figure 2. Expected volume of trade with posted prices.
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to their model. We introduce some new functions as defined in their anism that only allows trade if w – z≥ 1, which is not feasible given
paper and modify our earlier definition of the allocation mechanism that w, z
. We pick the second value of a which gives us
q(w, z, x). For any number α ≥ 0, let

As in the previous section, we consider a setting with no information about waiting times and one with complete information. Now
that the broker has information about the difference between the
rider’s willingness to pay and the driver’s opportunity cost, she
can capture some of this difference by offering different prices. We
solve for the revenue-maximizing mechanism in addition to the
welfare-maximizing calculations and prove two propositions.
Proposition 2. Providing information about waiting times
restricts trade but increases expected revenue.
Proposition 3. The revenue-maximizing mechanism is more
restrictive than the welfare-maximizing mechanism.

4.1. No Information About Waiting Times
Plugging in our model parameters and

into (5), we must have

Thus, welfare is maximized in a mechanism where trade takes
place whenever the difference in the rider’s willingness to pay and
the driver’s opportunity cost is at least X2 + ¼. The resulting expected welfare is given by

Since price has an opposite and symmetric effect on each agent’s
utility, it does not appear in the welfare equation. We do not compute an optimal price here but note that any price that satisfies individual rationality and incentive compatibility can be used. Under
this mechanism, the expected volume of trade is

For the revenue-maximizing mechanism, let U0 denote the expected revenue of the broker, where

(6) By Theorem 4 in Myerson and Satterthwaite’s paper, the broker’s
expected revenue is maximized by a mechanism in which trade is
Thus, conditional on the rider and driver agreeing to trade, the ex- allowed if and only if cr(w, x, 1) ≥ cd(z, x, 1). The revenue-maximizpected difference between their valuations must be at least ½. In ing allocation mechanism is
other words,

This results in a stricter restriction than the one we had with only
individual rationality in section 2. Now we must have
.
Theorem 2 by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) states that an incentive-compatible mechanism such that ud(1) = ur(0) = 0 and q =
qa for some
maximizes expected total gains from trade
among all incentive-compatible individually rational mechanisms.
Furthermore, in our context cd(z, x, 1) and cr(w, x, 1) are increasing
functions and the interiors of the two valuation intervals have a
non-empty intersection, thus such a mechanism must exist.

All that remains is to construct prices that satisfy individual rationality and incentive compatibility. We define them in the same
manner as Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). If trade occurs, the
rider is charged the lowest valuation she could have quoted and still
gotten the ride and the driver is paid the highest valuation she could
have quoted and still given the ride. It is easy to check that this
is incentive compatible. For example, the driver reporting a lower
valuation has no effect on prices and reporting a higher valuation
decreases the probability of trade. Formally stated,

In order for each agent’s minimum utility to be 0, that is that ud(1)
= ur(0) = 0 and q = qa, we must satisfy (6) with equality. Plugging Under the revenue-maximizing mechanism, the broker should
in the definition of qa
charge the rider
and should offer to pay the driver
,
and trade occurs if and only if both agents are willing to trade at
these prices. The expected revenue is then
So we must have
. The first value results in a mechhttps://elischolar.library.yale.edu/yurj/vol2/iss1/8
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The corresponding maximum expected welfare is given by

4.2. Public Waiting Times
We now compute welfare-maximizing and revenue-maximizing
mechanisms with the broker revealing realized waiting times to
agents. To satisfy individual rationality and incentive compatibil- and the expected volume of trade is
ity, we must have

Conditional on the rider and driver agreeing to trade, the same con- The revenue-maximizing mechanism is given by
dition holds as with no information about waiting times:

Note that even before we optimize for welfare or revenue, incentive The broker should offer the following prices:
compatibility imposes the restriction x ≤ ½. If agents know how
long they will have to wait, waiting times must be sufficiently small
for market participation.
We determine a welfare-maximizing mechanism using the same
methodology as the previous subsection. To have ud(1) = ur(0) = 0 resulting in
for q = qa, we must satisfy (9) with equality.

Figure 3 plots expected welfare and Figure 4 plots expected volume
Thus,
or
and we pick the second value, as before. The of trade for welfare-maximizing mechanisms under no information
welfare-maximizing mechanism is defined by
and complete information about waiting times.
Communicating waiting times incentivizes agents to restrict trade
to favourable waiting times, thereby increasing welfare and expected revenue. The revenue-maximizing mechanism under both information regimes is more restrictive than the welfare-maximizing
mechanism, as seen in Figure 6, which plots the minimum differ-

Figure 3. Expected welfare with reported valuations.

Figure 4. Expected volume of trade with reported valuations.
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the scenario where the broker elicits w and z from the rider and
driver. Without that, the posted price is independent of x, as we
showed earlier.
Proposition 4. An intermediate information revelation regime allows for a larger range of waiting times than complete
information with only a small decrease in expected welfare
and expected revenue.
is public knowledge and agents
We assume that the threshold
choose actions based on their expected waiting cost
. For low
waits, the expected time is given by
Figure 5. Expected revenue with reported valuations.

ence in w and z needed. In order for the broker to profitably exploit And for high waits, agents expect
control over trading, she must demand a larger minimum difference
in the rider’s willingness to pay and the driver’s opportunity cost.

5. INTERMEDIATE INFORMATION REVELATION

We compute welfare-maximizing mechanisms for the two categories separately and pick to maximize the expected total welfare.
Providing complete information about waiting times allows the To satisfy individual rationality and incentive compatibility for
broker to optimally restrict trade, but forces her to only serve a each of the time categories, we modify (6) with our new expected
limited range of waiting times or distances. The question arises: waiting times:
instead of the two extreme information settings we considered, can
we do better through an intermediate revelation?
Suppose the broker informs agents only whether their waiting time
fell into a low or high category. That is, for some
, the broker reveals

The second expression is positive only when

We then redo the calculations we did for bilateral trade under no
could be exactly the halfway point 0.5X, but this is not necessar- information about x and define aL and aH for xL and xH, respectively.
ily the optimal value as we show later. We restrict our attention to These model parameters are stated in the appendix while here we

Figure 6. Trading condition for revenue maximization.
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simply describe the optimal allocation mechanisms.

resulting in

We now construct a mechanism for revenue-maximization. For low
waiting times, the revenue-maximizing mechanism is defined by
Total expected welfare is given by

This expression is maximized at

For high waiting times, the broker should implement

And (10) simplifies to X ≤ 0.605. For low values of X where X ≤
0.605, trade will occur in both low and high time segments. This
bound on X is stricter compared to the no information regime but
allows trade for a large range of waiting times than those allowed
by complete information.
For values of X beyond 0.605, we can no longer have trade in the
higher segment since the required difference between w and z becomes greater than 1. As X keeps increasing, there will come a
point when trade will not be possible in the lower segment either
since is a linear function of X. This occurs exactly at the point
where X > 1.171. However, the broker can always pick a different
threshold value to still allow trade for low waiting times. When the
broker provided no information about waiting times, no trade was
possible once X crossed a threshold since the expected waiting time
necessarily grew as X increased. By having two different time segments instead, the broker can maintain positive trade and still gain
welfare and revenue even as X becomes very large. Specifically, for
X larger than 0.605, the broker can choose a new threshold value to
optimize for trade only in the lower segment. Now the objective
function becomes

Here, too, the high wait category is restricted by (10). With low
waiting times, riders are charged less and drivers are paid more
compared to agents with high waiting times. Even though the probability of trade with higher waiting times is low, the broker reaps
a higher revenue from those trades with higher waiting times that
are realized. These results mirror what we often see in practice with
rideshare platforms. For example, rides in the city centre have lower expected waiting times due to a higher supply of drivers and
lower expected distances between riders and drivers. Such rides
are often cheaper and drivers earn a higher wage by driving in the
city centre. By contrast, rides in suburbs outside the city or in less
busy areas tend to have higher expected distances, waiting times,
and rider prices.
The total expected revenue is calculated as the weighted sum of the
expected revenue from each category.

which is maximized at

This value no longer depends on the maximum waiting time X, but
instead maintains a constant volume of trade for a fixed subset of which is maximized at
low waiting times. In summary, the welfare-maximizing mechanism for intermediate information is
Plugging this into (10), revenue-maximizing trade is realized in
both high and low segments for X ≤ 0.579. As with welfare-maximization, this bound is more restrictive than trade with no informaPublished by EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale, 2021
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Figure 7. Expected welfare across three levels of information about time.

Figure 8. Expected revenue across three levels of information about time.
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tion but less restrictive than trade with complete information. For
higher values of X, we can restrict our attention to the low waiting
time segment and choose a different threshold value.

Proposition 5. Increasing rider sensitivity reduces flexibility
in the marketplace and has a negative impact on expected
revenue.
Proposition 6. The cost of a rider’s higher sensitivity must be
borne by the driver.

This expression is maximized at

For individually rational, incentive-compatible trade, we plug in
the rider’s new valuation into (5) to get

Thus, the revenue-maximizing mechanism for intermediate information is
Thus, conditional on the rider and driver agreeing to trade, we must
have
w – z ≥ ½ + (1 + s) x2
And the expected revenue is

Figures 7 and 8 display a comparison of expected welfare and expected revenue for the three information levels of x: no information, complete information, and intermediate binary categories.
The vertical line markers represent the point at which trade stops
taking place in the high waiting time segment and is restricted to a
small, fixed subset of waiting times. Intermediate revelation gets us
remarkably close to the maximum expected welfare and expected
revenue under full revelation and is less restrictive.

6. RIDER SENSITIVIY TO WAITING TIME
We now consider a preliminary extension of our model. So far we
have assumed that riders have homogeneous preferences over waiting times and both riders and drivers are affected identically by a
change in waiting time. In reality, agents often have heterogeneous
preferences. We relax this assumption and allow for variation in the
rider’s sensitivity to waiting time.

and we must restrict trade to the subset of waiting times where
. The more sensitive riders are to waiting times, the lower
is the range of waiting times acceptable to them. The welfare-maximizing mechanism is

Intermediate calculations are included in the appendix. Higher values of s restrict trade by demanding that the rider have a higher
willingness to pay or the driver have a lower opportunity cost. The
negative impact on welfare is illustrated by the expression for expected welfare:

Holding all else constant, a higher sensitivity reduces welfare.
Overall, welfare is decreasing in both X and S. However, the two
variables offset each other. If riders are less sensitive to waiting
times, the platform can provide service in larger areas than it would
have been able to with homogeneous sensitivity. Conversely, high
sensitivities allow trade for only sufficiently low waiting times.

We obtain similar restrictions for revenue maximization. ReveLet s denote the rider’s sensitivity, where s ~ U(0, S). We redefine nue-maximizing trade occurs for
the rider’s valuation from (1) as
vr = w – sx2
Intuitively, sensitivity represents a rider’s willingness to wait. For
more sensitive riders, a unit increase in waiting cost leads to a
greater reduction in their valuation of the ride. We restrict our attention to the setting where the broker communicates realized waiting
times to agents. We also assume that rider sensitivities are public
knowledge. The remaining model parameters are the same, with the
small change that they now depend on s as an additional variable.
We prove the following propositions.

Higher sensitivity to waiting times reduces the probability of trade
and revenue-maximizing trade is more restrictive than the welfare-maximizing mechanism. We construct prices as per (7) and
(8).
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This results in expected revenue

For higher sensitivities, the broker earns more revenue on realized
trades. However, the probability of trade reduces faster than the
corresponding increase in the difference in prices. In this particular
pricing mechanism, each agent’s price depends on the other’s agent
valuation rather than their own. As a result, notice that the cost of
the rider’s sensitivity to waiting times is not borne by the rider herself, but is instead transferred to the driver. This must be the case
under our model’s assumptions. Sensitivity serves as a proxy for
the rider’s waiting time elasticity and we might expect that riders
with different sensitivities would be willing to pay different prices.
However, such a mechanism would no longer be incentive compatible as riders would be incentivized to lie about their sensitivities.
Instead, it is the driver’s willingness to compensate the rider for
her sensitivity that makes trade possible. Thus, the platform should
seek to match riders with high sensitivities to drivers with low opportunity costs.

strategically to inuence bargaining. Bergemann and Morris (2019)
note that the less information agents have about priors, the more
strategically the broker can use information design. If the prior disin section 5
tribution of waiting times or the threshold value
weren’t public knowledge, as we assumed, the broker could communicate expected waiting times that were lower than
, thereby
improving outcomes for low realizations of x. Revealed waiting
times could also well depend on w and z in order to incentivize
agents to accept certain bargains. Such a setting could allow the
broker to more fully exploit the tradeoff between time and money.
For example, the broker may charge higher prices and offer lower
waiting times to riders with a high willingness to pay. We only provide a preliminary discussion of heterogeneity in rider preferences
over time, but further work on the topic could explore the impact of
varied rider sensitivity on optimal information design.
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APPENDIX
Model Parameters for Welfare-Maximization in Section 5
Under welfare maximization for low waits,

For high waits,

, resulting in

, and

Model Parameters for Welfare-Maximization in Section 6
The functions needed for welfare maximization are given by

and expected welfare is maximized when

The only value of a for which trade is feasible is

resulting in
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